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Monitoring Elections
in El Salvador and
Nicaragua
Jack Spence
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I observed the February 1990 elections in Nicaragua as a member of both the Latin
American Studies Association observation team and that of Hemisphere Initiatives, a
group with which I have worked. In El Salvador I headed the Hemisphere Initiatives

team.

once

I

visited

my

Nicaragua

me

academic year allowed
I

that
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should say by
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way of comparison with Fred Gamst's presentation about Ethiopia

Nicaragua and El Salvador are ethnically and linguistically homogeneous societies

which the conflicts that led to war were based on class divisions and ideology. The
main exception to this general pattern would be the geographically isolated Atlantic
coast region of Nicaragua, which is ethnically and linguistically complex and has about
in

10 percent of the country's population. In El Salvador the indigenous population that
survived into this century was largely destroyed or driven underground in 1932
the

when

government and landowners slaughtered people they suspected of participating

in a

revolt against coffee plantation owners.

Background of Elections
and El Salvador

in

Nicaragua

The chronology handed out summarizes events in those two countries with an emphasis
on elections and international negotiations. To refresh your memories: in Nicaragua, the
leftist

Sandinistas overthrew a long-standing, U.S. -supported dictatorial family, the

Somozas,

in July 1979.

By

1981, the Reagan administration was financing and organiz-

ing a war of counterrevolutionaries (contras) to do

away with

the Sandinistas.

In El Salvador in 1979, several leftist guerrilla groups that coalesced in

1980 into the

Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), and a broad array of militant grassroots
groups threatened

to

overthrow a military government, which was replaced in October

of 1979 by a reformist civilian military government. This government, however, was not
willing or able to stop

high levels of
Jack Spence
Boston.

is

human

human

rights abuses,

which

in fact rapidly escalated. Despite

rights abuses, including the assassination of the archbishop in

an associate professor of political science, University of Massachusetts
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March 1990, the Carter administration increased military aid in 1980. By April the
country was in a civil war, the government pitted against the FMLN guerrillas. The first
Reagan administration (1981-1984) then made quantum leaps in that aid and supported
elections to legalize the

was going

to a

government

democracy. The

as well as to convince congressional critics that aid

FMLN

and the

civilian left boycotted the first several

rounds of these elections.

Throughout the 1980s wars raged on
and physical destruction, considering
limited extent.

Some

in

in

Nicaragua

in the 1980s,

which he employed numerous

By way

died.

both countries. They created enormous social

employed

aerial

bombing

to a relatively

75,000, mostly civilians, were killed in El Salvador, a country the

size of Massachusetts with a population

were killed

in

that they

somewhat smaller

and

in the

air attacks

at 5 million. Fifty

1978-1979 war

on urban

that toppled

thousand

Somoza,

centers, another 25,000 to 30,000

of contrast, the United States, with eighty times the population of Nicara-

number of those in
was traumatized. It is impossible

gua, had fewer casualties in Vietnam than the

either

Salvador, and the United States

to find adults in either

Nicaragua or El Salvador

were much

losses

who have

greater.

Nicaragua or El

not lost friends or relatives, and in rural areas the

Economic

were mammoth. One

losses

roughly one year's gross export earnings,

left

gua the economy declined some 24 percent

billion in capital,

El Salvador in the early 1980s. In Nicara-

in the late 1980s,

and

in

1988 the inflation

was 30,000 percent, too high to measure accurately. The economy was
and chaotic, far worse than the war-damaged Salvadoran economy.

rate

The Peace Process

in free fall

Elections

In both countries, as illustrated in Table

1,

their

1979 break with past authoritarian

governments had been followed by elections and new constitutions, the 1984 election
Nicaragua and a series of elections

in El Salvador.

in

But these elections had not been

accepted as legitimate by the armed opposition in each country, by several civilian

groups in Nicaragua, and until the 1989 elecby exiled civilian leftist groups in El Salvador.
The two elections in question, that of 1990 in Nicaragua and March 1994 in El Salvador, were part of a peace process in each country. In Nicaragua the war was not over

politically conservative anti-Sandinista
tion,

and the contra army remained
conservatives

who had

in the field, but conservative political groups, including

previously been in the civilian leadership of the U.S. -supported

contras, agreed to participate if the electoral processes

were free and

fair.

They had

refused to participate in the 1984 election.
In El Salvador, the
tion

war was over but the

elections were a key part of the implementa-

phases of the peace process. They were the

would

participate. In

first in

both countries, they were the

first

which the

FMLN

ever in which

guerrillas

all political

groups from
candidate.
tions, the

As
1994

left to right would be represented and in which there would be no military
Were they not perceived as being free and fair elections, legitimating elecpeace processes would have been gravely, perhaps mortally, wounded.

part of the guarantee for these "peace process" elections, 1990 in Nicaragua and

was extensive outside observation of the elections, particuby the UN, and in Nicaragua by the Organization of American States (OAS) as
well. While this now seems commonplace, at the time, Nicaragua, in 1990, had far and
away the most thoroughly and extensively internationally observed election ever. Since
in El Salvador, there

larly

then, election observation has

been a growth business. Between the

90

OAS

and the

UN

there

were 900 election day observers

in

Nicaragua

for

some 4,000

polling places, plus

another 1,500 invited and uninvited observers representing governments to small church
groups.

More

important, several dozen

UN

and

OAS

observers, and a half dozen other

small groups including the Latin American Studies Association, Hemisphere

Initiatives.

and the Carter Center, watched the entire electoral process from the negotiation of the

ground rules to voter registration to the campaigns. For example, every campaign rally
had international observers. It was really the first time that election observation was
taken to mean something more extensive than the few days surrounding an election.
An essential difference between the two elections, however, was that while the parties

considered the

and

fair elections,

UN

and other outside observers

to be, in a sense, a guarantor for free

or at least a mediator and relatively impartial witness, the U.S. posi-

tion in Nicaragua in

1989 was that only the ongoing presence of the contra army would

put sufficient pressure on the Sandinistas to have a free and

Nicaraguan election not only was held during a war
but the threat was that

if

the elections results

that

fair election.

seemed

to

That

is,

the

be dwindling down,

were "wrong," the United

States and the

contras would continue the war.

At

issue, then, is the extent to

which these two elections contributed

to the

peace

process in their respective countries. To what extent did they contribute to a process of

democratization?

And

to

what extent did international observation contribute

to these

contributions?

Contributions to the Peace Process

It is

clear that the elections contributed to both of these processes and were necessary,

but not sufficient, elements to each process.
countries would have been very different.

have plunged back into a re-escalated war.

Had

It is
It is

the elections been a blatant fraud, both

virtually certain that

Nicaragua would

harder to say that about El Salvador,

which was twenty-six months into an implementation of a peace treaty at the time of
it is far from inconceivable that at least portions of the FMLN would
have restocked their military supplies.
I would also argue that although a necessary part of the peace process, the elections
the election, but

were,

among

other necessary parts, a relatively minor part, and in each case the results

of the election, more than the fairness of the electoral process
the peace process. This

is

itself,

may have enhanced
make on the

a negative, though hypothetical, judgment to

"who won" is not supposed to be an element in deciding
was free and fair.
Of more importance to the peace process are agreements about stopping fighting,
laying down arms, and providing security guarantees, which usually also imply some
economic promises, to those most closely involved in the fighting. This was not accomplished in Angola, for example, where the "peace process" elections proved to be but a
brief interlude in a war even more destructive than those in Central America.
Of course, it had not been accomplished in Nicaragua either. But in that case the
electoral candidate backed by the United States and by the contras, Violeta Chamorro
and her thirteen-party UNO coalition, won, and the Sandinistas honored the results and
insisted that there would be no purge of the country's military, no replacement of it by
the contras. Had the results been the other way, it is far from clear that the Bush administration, the contras, sectors of Chamorro's coalition, to say nothing of Jesse Helms,
election's contribution, as

whether

it
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Table

1

Chronology of War and Elections
Year
1931,

1978

El

in El

Salvador and Nicaragua

Nicaragua

Salvador

1932 slaughter

of insur-

runs

rectionists;

military

government

for large

U.S. /International

U.S. appointed military head;

Somoza takes

over,

murders

nationalist Sandino.

landowners.

1979

Coup;

civilian junta

1980

Carter distances United

"liberal" military

States from Somoza,

Sandinistas oust [son of]

takes power. Somoza.

Salvadoran

military.

Carter backs "new" SalvaArchbishop assassinated; "Moderates" quit government, ^oran govt; cool relations
civil war begins.
with Nicaragua. Reagan
elected

1981

1

982

FMLN

final

offensive

fails.

"Covert" aid to contras,

U.S. contra war begins.

massive aid to Salvador
through 1980s

Constituent Assembly

CIA actions

elections/FMLN boycotts

discovered; Congress

in

Nicaragua

protests.

1983

New constitution; in war, War
FMLN gains; U.S. military

Latin peace process under
way; over nonmilitary contra

escalates.

aid up; helicopters.

1984

Duarte elected;
talks with

aid.

failed

FMLN.

Reagan

Ortega and Constitutional

Assembly

rights boycott.

Centrist Christian

1985

crats win

Demo-

assembly

elec-

reelected; aid to

Salvador no longer contended;
peace process thwarted.

elected; civilian

Economic plunge begins;
Soviet helicopters

in

war.

tion.

U.S. Congress votes

1986

War

War

grinds on.

grinds on.

$100

million military aid to

contras

in

June.

Iran

contragate scandal engulfs

Reagan administration.

1987
1

988

War

War

grinds on.

ARENA

wins assembly

Arias peace treaty

grinds on.

Tenative peace moves

Bush elected.

election.

1989

FMLN changes
tion

Election

campaign conserva-

tives participate

UNO
OAS ob-

in

UN and

In Nicaragua Bush keeps the
contras at war to guarantee

December

Cristiani elected/Tet

coalition;

offensive; Jesuits assas-

serve but contra war goes on U.S. invades Panama,
at lower level.

sinated.

1990

negotia-

stance/ARENA's

Peace negotiations begin. Chamorro and

UNO

elected

free elections. In

in

February; military headed by

Humberto Ortega; contra war
ends.
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Year

1991

El

Nicaragua

Salvador

Peace negotiations
conclude Decem-

U.S. /International

Contra land takeovers;

UNO

splits.

ber 31.

1992

Treaty signed; imple-

mentation crises;

Land takeovers; more
splits;

economic

UNO

Clinton elected; Senator

Helms

offensive on Nicaragua.

crisis

modest economic
growth.

1993

Election of century

campaign begins;
modest economic

Mass

protests, unemploy-

ment, land crises

growth.

1994

ARENA wins

Constitutional crisis over

Helms, chairman of Foreign

power

Relations

municipal elections/

Sandinista divisions

FMLN
1997

presi-

dency. Assembly and

of president/

finishes second.

ARENA loses ground, Aleman defeats FSLN Ortega
FMLN gains in assem- for president and wins conbly

Committee

and municipal

trol

of

assembly

in

tarnished

U.S. "citizen" land claims

in

Nicaragua; declined U.S. pres-

ence

elections.

elections,

Continued Helms pressure on

in El

Salvador

Under the Salvadoran 1983 Constitution, assembly and

local elections are held every three years,
presidential elections every five years; no successive terms for presidents. Under the Nicaraguan
Constitution, all presidential, assembly, and municipal elections coincided every six years, with

1987

reelection permitted. In 1995, presidential terms were for five years with no successive terms, other
terms four years. Both countries employ proportional representation for assembly elections.

would have accepted the results and brought the war
that Bush would have faced increasing difficulties in

to

an end

— though

I

must admit

getting Congress to appropriate

funds for the contras.

Had

the

FMLN

won

the election in El Salvador,

it is

not clear that the military, pro-

testations to the contrary notwithstanding, or, according to interviews of

major coffee

growers conducted by sociologist Jeffrey Paige, powerful business sectors would have
I would not say that war would have broken out in
would have been an increase in death squad activity,
the military would have pressured the incoming government in numerous ways, and
there would have been massive capital flight.
As it stands, the post-electoral period and post-peace treaty period in El Salvador
has been tranquil (relative to Nicaragua, not relative to Massachusetts) because a detailed treaty, however filled with crisis points and watered-down implementation, made
at least minimal provision for laying down arms and for providing for ex-combatants,
with considerable U.S. and international aid to back it up. However, it is important to
note here that during the election campaign and since the election, five prominent members of the FMLN have been gunned down. There have been no arrests. Though the
government has been quick to assert that these people have been victims of El
Salvador's intensive crime wave, no one in the government has been similarly gunned
down.

been prepared

to accept the election.

that event, but short of that, there
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In Nicaragua, and despite a very clean election and results the contras wanted, the

country has been plagued for four years by numerous armed bands of contras making

demands but high-level political demands (the minister of defense
Humberto Ortega should be fired and so should the minister of the presidency,
Chamorro's son-in-law Antonio Lacayo), demands which have been loudly echoed in
actually, it is not clear who is echoing whom.
Washington by Senator Helms
not only economic

—

Have Elections Contributed
Again yes,

to Democratization?

in the sense that blatant frauds

would have done

But taking any

the reverse.

democracy even slightly more ample than simply requiring regularly
scheduled elections with open campaigning and accurate vote counting, the elections
were but one piece in a complex puzzle of democratization. In El Salvador, despite
definition of

extensive international observation, nudging, and lobbying, the elections were not con-

ducted very well.
In addition, in El Salvador, up until four months ago [August 1994] the entire Supreme Court was selected for five-year terms by the majority party in the assembly, and
the Supreme Court in turn selected the lower court judges and controlled their budgets.
That this system has recently been changed is not the result of the "elections of the

FMLN's

century" but rather of the

insistence on judicial reform in the peace negotia-

tions.

With several thousand instances of human

rights abuses, the court

and police systems

have had two successful prosecutions in fifteen years involving military defendants, and

one of those was overturned by an amnesty law passed
selected Truth

cases of

Commission mandated under

human

literally

the accords had

rights abuses. [That remains true in

legislature.

examine

its

The assembly can

components. That

is

UN-

in notorious

October 1998.]

In both countries, the military retains virtual administrative

from the

hours after a

named names

and budgetary autonomy

veto a budget bottom line, but can't, or won't,

changing

in

Nicaragua. In El Salvador

inconceivable that there would be a civilian minister of defense.

it is

Though

politically

the peace

process drastically reduced the size of the armies in each country, in El Salvador
officer corps

My
this.

the

remain but with relatively few troops

point here

is

job. Rather

is

a process, and

it is

it

all

the

command.

not to fault the elections and their results for not changing

Democratization

whole

to

would not be

fair to

all

of

charge any election with

to say that the electoral process has

made

only small contri-

butions in other institutional areas and that the international spotlight shines brightest

only on election day

can declare that

X

—

and

after that the U.S. president, at least if

Y

happy with the

results,

countries have joined the democratic team.

Did the electoral process

in its

own terms

contribute to democratization? First,

it

should be noted that whether these two elections would be part of the democratizing
process was and remains a contested issue.

The Sandinistas claim that the 1984 election
was democratic; what was undemocratic was that the United States and the contras did
not accept the results. The conservative governing party ARENA in El Salvador makes
similar claims about the seven elections that preceded the 1994 election.

In terms of conduct, the Nicaraguan election gets much better grades than the El
Salvador election. Though turnout was considerably higher in both countries than in
previous elections, the voter registration and voting processes in El Salvador effectively
excluded several tens of thousands of potential voters and did so with a heavy bias
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war zones. Voter

against the poor, particularly those in former

cumbersome,

was

registration

legally

particularly for peasants without birth certificates, time-consuming, ex-

So was voting, and there was much
some 25,000 to 80,000 who showed up with

pensive, and geographically inconvenient for many.

confusion

at polling places, resulting in

who

voting card in hand being unable to vote. At least 80,000

attempted to register

never received a card.
In a country in
electoral process

which pre-election surveys showed high

among

said that the elections
free

and

fair

—

levels of cynicism about the

a substantial minority of the population

would be fraudulent; fewer than a

the election, despite a higher turnout of voters

who

do much to allay cynicism.
In Nicaragua these processes were a model of efficiency and

Supreme Electoral Council, as they had been
paign, however, was one in which a foreign power was an open,
ministration of the

one of the

— more than one-third

third said that they

would be

could vote, did not

fairness under the ad-

The cam-

in 1984.
if legal,

contributor to

sides.

Did the Observers Make a Difference?
Yes. In Nicaragua, while there

were many campaign complaints from both

sides about

harassment, complaints that shared the distinction of being most difficult to verify, the

contenders in general agreed that the observers headed off crises and built some faith

in

opponents in the Electoral Commission, which they conceived of as being controlled by
the Sandinistas.

What

when

aided this process was

Republican Eliot Richardson,

who was working

the

Democrat Jimmy Carter and the
UN, themselves gave good

with the

preliminary grades to the conduct of voter registration and the general conduct of the
election

campaign period. (Had the

results

UN, and Richardson, and Carter giving
some constraints on Bush's actions.)

come

out the other way, the effects of the

the election a

In El Salvador, the outside observers, in the

good grade would have placed

months before the

election, clearly

UN

helped to improve a flawed process. For several months, for example, the

were providing most of the
tration process,

observers

rural transportation for electoral authorities during the regis-

an action that clearly exceeded the

UN

terms of reference.

Many more

people would have been excluded from voting.

There

are,

however, costs and

limits. In El Salvador, I

would estimate

the costs of

financing international observation on election day only (counting air fares, housing,
food, and ground transportation) to

make

the

minimum wage

in El

amount

to at least

Salvador (and

$2 per vote

many make

cast.

less), that

For those

amounts

who

to half a

The entire election, counting campaign, administration, and observation
was far more expensive than that.
The UN style is to be as obvious as possible. It wants people to know that they are
being observed. But in a poor country, the wealth such a style involves, plus the high
salaries paid to UN observers, creates some resentment among poor and rich
the
day's wage.
costs,

—

poor for obvious reasons, the rich because the

end housing. There

is

UN

observers drive up the cost of high-

also an understandable nationalist sentiment:

Who

are these out-

was introduced at a social event as an election
observer, a Nicaraguan brightly welcomed me and said he looked forward to seeing me
in the United States the following year. When I asked why he would be visiting the
siders to grade us? In Nicaragua, after

United States, he said he hoped to

I

come

to

observe election procedures
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Finally,

though the

election,

gua

its

as well

ground

UN had a seasoned

team of observers

— and

massive election day team

— included many people who had

this

little

months preceding the

in the

would be

true for the

OAS

in Nicara-

observing experience and no back-

in the country, although, unlike other election observation teams, a majority

spoke Spanish.

When

troubles arose in El Salvador, they

were

less than clear

about

what they should do.

The Prospects
Progress has been made. The elections were procedurally excellent in Nicaragua and

mediocre

in

El Salvador with

its

was

bias against the poor. Turnout

— but on a par with the United

excellent in Nicara-

Reform of the Supreme Court has begun in El Salvador with consensus building in the assembly; in
Nicaragua, after some years of division and stalemate, the assembly seems to have
fashioned a working majority, ironically including Sandinistas, which is providing some
gua, only fair in El Salvador

stability. In

Nicaragua, there

is

a tradition of grassroots participation

Without international observation the next time, however,
El Salvador will improve

its

States.

electoral procedural behavior,

between the elections.

it is

not clear to

though there

is

me how

a chance that

there will be reform in this area, at least legislated if not implemented.

The main concern

for each country takes opposite directions.

The

UNO

coalition of thir-

common: dislike of the Sandinistas. It is now badly divided, if it
can even be said to exist. The governing system has barely governed, and economic growth has
been nonexistent. Unemployment is extremely high. In both countries crime, violent crime, is
at shocking levels. Jesse Helms will likely cut off all aid to Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, despite
teen parties had one thing in

the civic virtues of the election,

cism among the

electorate.

I

believe, after four years of

The governing system

right-wing, authoritarian anti-Sandinista
short,

were there an election tomorrow,

electoral result that

would

political fragmentation so

either

I

no progress, there

is

deep cyni-

fragmented and just barely a system.

A

the current front runner for the 1996 election. In

would predict a

drastic reduction in turnout

and an

be a one-person authoritarian president or a continuation of

extreme as

we have

In El Salvador

is

is

to

make

the country barely governable.

the opposite of fragmentation. Quite apart

from the ongoing pres-

ence of death squads, apparently now also tied to drug running, the rightist ARENA has just won, by
a

commanding margin

the assembly election,

at all levels, its
it

second consecutive election. Though

it

got but 44 percent in

has a working majority and confronts an opposition divided into three or

four parties, the larger ones of which, including the

FMLN,

are in the process of dividing.

It

won 68

percent of the presidential runoff vote, and with a winner-take-all system in municipal elections,

it

has undivided control of municipal councils in 80 percent of the municipalities despite winning 44

percent of the vote.

which outspent
state

may

These

its

It is

also the party that 99 percent of the wealthy people in the country support,

opposition in the election campaign

by extremely

large margins.

A one-party

be on the horizon.
futures, should they

come to pass,

are not entirely the product of the very destructive wars,

but they are in no small part shaped by them.

The wars have ended and

elections have been held,

but reconstruction, economic well-being for the majority, reconciliation, and a deep-seated
ratization with incentives to participate at the grassroots

remain distant goals.

democ-

$g

This speech was originally delivered at the Distinguished Lecture Series, University of
Massachusetts Boston, December 12, 1994.
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Reflections on Elections and

Peace Four Years Later

When asked

in

October 1998

elections and peace,

I

to draft a brief postscript to the foregoing

was discomfited

1994 lecture with several forthright predictions

that are

speech on

had concluded the December

to note that I

now

hard to ignore.

Since the lecture, both Nicaragua and El Salvador experienced another major election round, while Nicaragua also held

two regional elections

in

two

its

theoretically

autonomous, ethnically diverse Atlantic Coast regions. Presidential, National Assembly,
and municipal elections, including
in

Nicaragua

tions in

in

direct

mayoral elections for the

time, took place

first

October 1996. El Salvador had National Assembly and municipal elec-

March 1997, and

presidential elections will be held in

March 1999.

El Salvador

My

predictions that El Salvador might be headed toward a one-party state have so far

ARENA

happily proved to be off the mark. The rightist

party suffered a

major decline

March 1997, going from 39 to 28 seats in the assembly and polling 35 percent fewer
votes than it had in 1994. By contrast, the up-and-coming former guerrilla group, the
Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), despite a major party split in the year folin

lowing the 1994 elections, improved

its

vote by 28.5 percent and almost tied

with 27 seats. The balance of 29 seats was divided
ing

ARENA

among seven

ARENA

other parties,

still

leav-

with a working majority in spite of facing major difficulties for votes that

require

more than

ments.

More

a

50 percent majority,

impressive, the

FMLN

for

example, ratification of international agree-

moved from winning

fourteen tiny municipalities

of 262 in 1994 to fifty-three in 1997, including the capital city and five of the next six
largest cities.

A

former rural guerrilla force,

it

demonstrated real urban vote-getting

prowess.

ARENA'S

decline was owing to several publicized, though unproven, heavy contact

internal fights, a president widely perceived as

following several years of growth.

Its

weak, and a sharp economic decline

vast resources for

the strong favorite for next year's presidential elections.

mains

campaigns, however, make

it

control of government re-

Its

firm.

Nevertheless, El Salvador continued to suffer from mediocre electoral processes.

Because a poorly administered system has

more

difficult for

ARENA

poor rural voters,

it is

rules that

biased in

make

voting and registering

ARENA'S

favor.

much

For example,

has buried proposals that would permit people to vote in their

own

neighbor-

hood rather than travel to distant locales. There are no controls or even records kept on
campaign financing. Incumbents can abuse state power to a degree unimaginable in the
United States, for instance, mounting government-paid-for television advertisements

promoting a government agency

that are actually thinly disguised

campaign propa-

ganda.

On

the other hand, the

passed a sterner

more

test in 1997.

I

democracy in El Salvador
would not accept an FMLN victory in

serious doubts about electoral
felt that the right

1994, but did not have to worry about that theoretical possibility.
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much in an election in which those who run
win easily, as in 1994. In March 1997 one
might have predicted that ARENA, which clearly was not going to lose control of the
state, would stoop to fraud as the results were going to be close, but there was little
honesty of a system

is

not demonstrated as

the system are likely, with a fair vote, to

evidence that
It

it

contribution to

with

did.

can also be said that peace has held in El Salvador, and

its

it.

homicide

Colombia

in

But El Salvador
rate

some

at

peace

is

fair elections

more dangerous than when

have

it

was

made

a

at war,

forty times that of the United States, one year topping even

world rankings. This violence

is

no doubt related

to the

war

— high

levels

of postwar unemployment, a male population broadly skilled in the use of weapons,

rampant and untreated post-traumatic
Other aspects of the transition

stress disorder.

peace and

to

full participation

been impressive. Voting turnout was 17 percent lower than

in

democracy have not

1994 and remains

diocre levels, and between elections political participation in citizens groups

is

at

me-

ex-

tremely low by U.S. standards. The judicial system, despite having the best Supreme

Court ever, has been very slow
out the system.

A brand-new

to rid itself

of corrupt and incompetent judges through-

police force, although certainly better than the old

been accused of corruption, abuse of
tence and has been engulfed by a volcanic increase in crime.

rights abusers, has itself

authority,

human

and incompe-

Nicaragua
I

predicted an electorate,

been subjected

might

face,

to a crisis

would not

made

cynical by a policy that since the end of the

war had

over every major fundamental issue a national government

turn out to vote as

two post-Somoza elections and

that

it

it

had, in very high numbers, in the previous

would

Arnoldo Aleman, a rightist
They turned out in high numbers,

likely elect

populist with authoritarian tendencies, as president.

but they elected Aleman.

On

the other hand,

I

did not anticipate that the legislature would, before the 1997

election, pass a series of constitutional

amendments and laws which would limit the
making it difficult for an authoritarian. The

strong presidential powers in Nicaragua,
president's controls over
military and

members of

making international agreements, appointing heads of the
the Supreme Court, for example, are sharply limited by legis-

lative strength and, in the case of the military, institutional authority.

government institution, the Supreme
would be subjected to a series of legal changes, budgetary pressures,
and mandated politicization that would make it considerably less effective and result in
a 1997 election day process marked by irregularities and significant chaos. This was in
sharp contrast to the model elections it administered under intense international scrutiny
in 1984 and 1990. The changes required the Supreme Electoral Council to appoint as
I

also did not anticipate that Nicaragua's best

Electoral Council,

regional electoral authorities, rather than professional staff, people nominated by political parties, to train the appointees,

and

system,

It

all

with a reduced budget.

at the

same

time, to

implement a new photo ID

performed well, but a greatly expanded electorate,

high turnout, and lack of experience and shenanigans resulted in long delays in vote
counts, recounts, and missing ballots.
I

also did not anticipate that the Sandinistas, the former left ruling party,
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would

undergo a
leader,

split and,

subsequent to the election, suffer a major political

crisis

when

its

former Nicaraguan president and 1997 candidate Daniel Ortega, would be pub-

accused of sexual abuse by his stepdaughter.

licly

still making semipolitical
demands despite all predictions that they would fade away once their favorite candidate,
and friend, Aleman was elected. The economy remains in a mess with unemployment

Eight years after the end of the war, armed groups are

rates at staggering levels for the eighth consecutive year

Aleman's

spite

two large

The

election.

parties

court system, at

some

and

levels,

little

new

investment de-

remains politicized, and the

have been agreeing to tinker with the electoral rules in their

favor, not

that of the small parties.

Though

the conditions in almost

crime

pretty

is

bad

in

Nicaragua

areas save crime are
El Salvador — and
— each country has had a measure of success
better in

all

in

mounting legitimating elections with
tributed to an

end

to their wars.

results recognized

But each country

must also be

retains significant

remnants of

sometimes manifesting themselves

authoritarian and corrupt pre- 1980 past,
institutional clothing. It

by the opposition, which con-

said,

in

its

new

however, that the military institution in each

has gone through major change. In Nicaragua, civilians across a wide political spectrum

and the Chamorro government agreed

to a military

law professionalizing and regulating

manner of selecting its top command. Its numbers and budget
20 percent of what they were in the 1980s, and there is no draft. The El Salvador

the military, including the
are

military has a distinctly lower profile

and even the

tary reform, in contrast to the country's

FMLN

points to the success of mili-

slowness of reform

in civilian areas.

damage and scars of the wars in which their socieconomies damaged or, in the case of Nicaragua, devas-

Neither country has overcome the
eties

were shredded and

their

tated.

El Salvador's

economy

is

in better

United States during the war and send
benefit has
relatively

come

at the

shape because many more Salvadorans

much more money home. That

is,

this

left for the

economic

expense of ripping the fabric of the society. This country did a

good job of holding

the Salvadoran

economy together during

the

war and an

even better job of tearing Nicaragua's apart.

The chief obstacle

democracy in each country is
government systems
because the peace process and electoral democracy have done little of direct relevance
to alleviate their poverty-stricken conditions. Solving that problem is far beyond the
that

to

promoting peace and transition

broad sectors of the population have

little faith

to

or stake in the

expertise of international electoral observers.

Addendum
The above

I write these lines on December
was devastated by hurricane Mitch, with damage in Nicaragua and Honduras by far the heaviest. Relief workers estimated some
10,000 dead in the two countries and damage that would take, assuming very large

reflections

20, 1998. In

were written

November

in

October 1998.

Central America
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more than a decade to repair. Every year there are headlines about
was the worst of the century in the region. To call it a natural disaster, however, disguises the human, political element. Agricultural policy for centuries
has favored a few owners of very large estates at the expense of the rural majority. Land
shortages force people to live up the sides of mountains. Money shortages force them to
international help,

hurricanes, but this

use trees for cooking

fuel.

storm creates a

mud

horse, can run.

Whole

slide,

Deforestation follows, so heavy rains cause erosion.

and

villages

cally for Nicaragua, but the

mud

slides

were wiped

can

move much

faster than a

out. It is not clear

what

A

major

human, or a

this will

mean

politi-

Aleman government, suspecting Sandinista mayors were

exaggerating the dangers as the rains poured down, minimized the danger and damage.

When

this

blunder was

clear,

it

attempted to control relief funds.

is of Old Testament proportions. In
972 Managua suffered a massive earthquake with more than 20,000 killed. Somoza,
the dictator, used aid funds to his own benefit. The 1978-1979 war against Somoza left
tens of thousands dead and an economy so ruined that the United Nations declared that
under "the best of circumstances," recovery from the war would not be complete until
the end of the century. Rather than the best of circumstances, the Reagan administration
financed a war against the Sandinistas that lasted ten years. Economic ruin far exceeded

Nicaragua's

last quarter

century of suffering

1

major hurricane in 1988. Deforestation brought
was a tidal wave and volcanic eruptions. With the

that of the prior war. Nature brought a

several years of drought.

Then

end of the millennium a year

there

off,

Mitch

arrived.
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